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Meaning of Taboos Using Counterfactual Logic

  • Grivas Muchineripi Kayange
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 135)

Abstract

This chapter studies the meaning of taboo expressions by departing from a consideration of their structure and use. While the chapter demonstrates that there is a strong presence and use of counterfactual logic in some Bantu languages, specifically the Chichewa language (This language is used by the Chewa tribes of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (a Bantu group of people.)), it argues that the study of these figurative expressions using the counterfactual framework offers a particular understanding of African philosophy and belief systems. The chapter demonstrates how to do African philosophy (with counterfactual logic) by studying taboos progressively from causal statements, conditional statements to counterfactual conditionals as they are used in the Chewa people’s various modes of communication.

Keywords

Taboos Counterfactual logic African philosophy Causal statements Beliefs 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Grivas Muchineripi Kayange
    • 1
  1. 1.Chancellor CollegeUniversity of MalawiZombaMalawi

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