Innovation and Crowdsourcing Contests

  • Laurence AlesEmail author
  • Soo-Haeng Cho
  • Ersin Körpeoğlu
Part of the Springer Series in Supply Chain Management book series (SSSCM, volume 6)


In an innovation contest, an organizer seeks solutions to an innovation-related problem from a group of independent agents. Agents, who can be heterogeneous in their ability levels, exert efforts to improve their solutions, and their solution qualities are uncertain due to the innovation and evaluation processes. In this chapter, we present a general model framework that captures main features of a contest, and encompasses several existing models in the literature. Using this framework, we analyze two important decisions of the organizer: a set of awards that will be distributed to agents and whether to restrict entry to a contest or to run an open contest. We provide a taxonomy of contest literature, and discuss past and current research on innovation contests as well as a set of exciting future research directions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laurence Ales
    • 1
    Email author
  • Soo-Haeng Cho
    • 1
  • Ersin Körpeoğlu
    • 2
  1. 1.Tepper School of BusinessCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.School of ManagementUniversity College LondonLondonUK

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