Robotic Responsibility

  • Anna Frammartino WilksEmail author
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 134)


This paper considers the question of whether humanoid robots may legitimately be viewed as moral agents capable of participating in the moral community. I defend the view that, in a strict sense, i.e., one informed by the fundamental criteria for moral agency, they cannot, but that they may, nonetheless, be incorporated into the moral community in another way. Specifically, I contend that they can be considered to be responsible for moral action upon an expanded view of collective responsibility, which I develop in the paper.


Moral agency Individual moral responsibility Collective moral responsibility Joint commitment Robotics Moral community Personhood Autonomy 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyAcadia UniversityTorontoCanada

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