Rational Coordination in Games with Enriched Representations
We consider pure win-lose coordination games where the representation of the game structure has additional features that are commonly known to the players, such as colouring, naming, or ordering of the available choices or of the players. We study how the information provided by such enriched representations affects the solvability of these games by means of principles of rational reasoning in coordination scenarios with no prior communication or conventions.
The work of Valentin Goranko was partly supported by a research grant 2015-04388 of the Swedish Research Council. The work of Antti Kuusisto was supported by the ERC grant 647289 “CODA”. We thank the anonymous referees for valuable comments.
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