Abstract
John Buridan (ca. 1300–1361) uses the concepts of actus and habitus in his psychology to explain the difference between actual or occurrent thoughts and the dispositions to think those same thoughts. But since mental qualities are immaterial, Buridan must finesse his account of material qualities to save the psychological phenomena. He argues that thoughts and dispositions are really distinct from the human soul and from each other, and that because a thought and its corresponding disposition are different kinds of quality, we cannot say that they differ merely in terms of intensity. This leaves him with the unresolved problem of explaining how one kind of psychological quality can be caused by another that is qualitatively distinct from it.
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Notes
- 1.
There is of course ambiguity in what Aristotle means by this, exploited by commentators from Theophrastus to the present day. Aristotle himself explains its essential activity in terms of the metaphor of light, a “positive state” which makes things actually visible (De an. 3.5, 430a14–17), but this is not precisely analogous because states are not activities. Actual thinking requires objects, or things to think about.
- 2.
Aristotle, De an. 3.4, 429b6–9 (trans. Smith, in Aristotle 1984, 682–683): “When thought has become each thing in the way in which a many who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery.”
- 3.
John Buridan, Summulae de dialectica, tract. 4, c. 3, §4 (trans. Klima , 260).
- 4.
John Buridan, Quaestiones in libros Aristotelis De anima (QDA), lib. 3, q. 6, n. 17.
- 5.
Aristotle, De an. 3.8, 432a8–9.
- 6.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 15, n. 25: “Credidit Alexander quod non est in homine potentia animae, vel anima, nisi materialis et extensa, et quod anima nostra in organo quod assignamus virtuti illi cogitativae exerceret omnes illos actus quos intellectui apponamus.”
- 7.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 15, n. 31: “Memoriam materialem diceret reservare intentiones omnium nostrarum cognitionum.” Buridan tends to blur the lines between the operations of the internal senses, sometimes attributing a certain operation to the imagination , sometimes to memory or to the cogitative power. This is of no import to the present debate, however.
- 8.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 4, n. 13: “Philosophus paganus teneret opinionem Alexandri.”
- 9.
Buridan agrees with Aristotle in holding that habits (Latin habitus; Greek hexis) and dispositions (Latin dispositio; Greek diathesis) are accidents in the first species of quality that make their subjects “well- or ill-disposed to operate,” or act (actus). They differ insofar as habits are “difficult to remove and separate” from their subjects, whereas dispositions are “easily separable.” Habits are considered a species of disposition in the sense that mere dispositions can turn into habits when they become sufficiently stable and long-lasting through frequent actualization , or practice, as in the case of virtues and vices See John Buridan, Summulae de dialectica, tract. 3, c. 5, §2 (trans. Klima , 184–185); cf. Aristotle, Cat. 8, 8b27–9a12.
- 10.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 2, q. 23, n. 13: “Apparet quod huiusmodi species vel intentiones reservantur, omni actu cognoscendi cessante, quia aliter, post cessationem ab huiusmodi actibus cognoscendi, non possemus somniari ac memorari formare imaginationes vel phantasmata nisi recurrendo ad sensibilia exteriora, cuius contrarium experimur. Sed etiam potest apparere quod huiusmodi species et intentiones, sic cessantibus actibus cognoscendi, non reservantur etiam in virtutibus cognoscitivis, hoc est dictum in organis in quibus anima est innata formare actum cognoscendi, quia tunc non cessaret actus cognoscendi, quoniam nihil apparet deficere requisitum ad formandum actus cognoscendi. Voluntas enim libera non habet in hoc locum tamen, quia non est in brutis. Cum quia in nobis non exit in actum sine actu cognoscendi, igitur necesse est concedere huiusmodi virtutem reservativam et organum in quo fiat huiusmodi reservatio, praeter organa in quibus innata est fieri actualis cognitio. Et si aliquis obiceret quod intellectus, qui est cognoscitivus, est etiam reservativus, quia aliter perirent habitus intellectuales, ego respondeo quod de hoc determinabitur in tertio libro in quinta quaestione.”
- 11.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 4, n. 13.
- 12.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 4, n. 13: “Dicta conclusio tenenda esset rationibus naturalibus, fide catholica circumscripta, ita quod philosophus paganus teneret eam. Probo quia ego puto quod philosophus paganus teneret opinionem Alexandri.”
- 13.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 6, n. 32: “Aristoteles per ‘intellectum passivum’ intelligit virtutem phantasticam seu cogitativam, quae corrumpitur non simpliciter cum ipsa sit idem quod anima intellectiva. Sed sic: quia corrumpuntur dispositiones naturales per quas erat innata exercere actum cognoscendi, cogitandi, vel phantasiandi. Ideo non potest amplius vitalem actum exercere sine quo Aristoteles putavit intellectum humanum non intelligere, quod non tenemus.”
- 14.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 2, q. 17, n. 20: “Tunc igitur venio ad dicendum quid intelligimus in proposito per ‘spirituale’ et ‘reale’. Et videtur mihi quod hoc nomen ‘spiritus’ primo dictum est et proprie de substantiis incorporeis, scilicet indivisibilibus et inextensis, cuiusmodi sunt Deus et intelligentiae, angeli, anima humana intellectiva. Et sic substantia, prima sui divisione, divideretur in substantias spirituales et corporeas. Et consequenter omnes formae accidentales huiusmodi substantiis spiritualibus inhaerentes dicuntur spirituales, ut actus intelligendi et habitus intellectuales. Deinde, quia illae substantiae quae primo dicuntur spirituales et spiritus sunt insensibiles, ideo similitudine ampliatum est hoc nomen ‘spiritus’ ad significandum corpora quae, propter sui subtilitatem, non sunt visibilia vel non terminant visum. Unde ob hoc, ventum vocamus spiritum et aliquando aerem. Unde respirationem dicimus aeris attractionem, et in nobis vocamus spiritus vitales corpora subtilia calida ex cibo digesto resoluta, per quae anima exercet opera vitae.”
- 15.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 2, q. 17, n. 21: “Et tamen, hoc non obstante, cum dicamus ista nomina ‘ens’ et ‘res’ converti secundum eorum principales significationes, et nos etiam sciamus per philosophiam insensibilia multa esse sensibilibus magis entia et perfectiora. Non debemus negare quin ista sint vere res simpliciter loquendo, licet non secundum vulgarem intentionem.”
- 16.
John Buridan, QDA, q. 2, q. 17, n. 22: “And thus, by equivocation, we would have to posit real and spiritual colours, real and spiritual sounds” (Et sic essent ponendi secundum aequivocationem colores reales et colores spirituales, soni reales et soni spirituales).
- 17.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 11, n. 20: “Quamdiu ego intelligo et scio, intellectus meus nec est intellectio nec scientia, immo intellectio et scientia sunt dispositiones diversae ab eo et sibi inhaerentes.”
- 18.
See Chartularium Universitatis parisiensis, vol. 2, no. 1147, articles 28–29. For discussion, see Thijssen (1998, 73–89).
- 19.
For a reconstruction of Mirecourt’s view here, see Edith Sylla, “A Guide to the Text” (Buridan 2015, lxii–lxvii).
- 20.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 11, n. 12: “In nobis intellectus et scientia non different, sed sunt idem intellectus, intellectio, et scientia, et omnino intellectio tua et omnes habitus intellectuales quibus tu intelligis aut consideras aut potes considerare sunt idem quod intellectus tuus.”
- 21.
The editors of books 1 and 2 of this text surmise that it was composed between 1352 and 1357 (Buridan 2015, xviii), which would suggest an even later date for the final version of Buridan’s De anima commentary.
- 22.
John Buridan, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, lib. 2, q. 3 (ed. Streijger and Bakker, 257–262).
- 23.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 11, n. 24: “Item ‘aliter et aliter se habere’ significat idem quod ‘alio et alio modo se habere’. Si igitur intellectus noster nunc est una opinio, et cras erit opinio contraria, alio et alio modo se habens, iste modus non erit iste modus, ex quo modi ponuntur alii. Si igitur modi sunt plures et alii ab invicem, et intellectus non est nec erit alius sed semper idem, necesse est intellectum esse alium ab illis modis et ab unoquoque illorum. Et tunc omnes difficultates quae erant de alietate vel identitate illarum opinionum, et maiores, revertuntur de illis modis. Ideo melius est statim stare in alietate illarum opinionum. Verum est enim quod intellectus humanus sit contrarie opinans, alio et alio modo se habens, etsi illi modi sunt illae opiniones: sicut etiam Sortes, prius albus et post niger alio et alio modo se habet, et illi modi sunt albedo et nigredo. Accidentia enim sunt modi et dispositiones substantiarum secundum quorum variationem substantia aliter et aliter se habet. Et omnino, aliter et aliter se habere requirit aliquam alietatem, et oportet quod illa detur in proposito, et non potest bene dari nisi alietas illorum habituum ad invicem vel ad intellectum.”
- 24.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 11, n. 25.
- 25.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 11, n. 29: “Sed si res tertio modo dicatur aliter et aliter se habens prius et posterius, scilicet circumscriptis exterioribus et quod eius partes non mutant situm ad invicem, tunc alietas designata per ‘aliter et aliter se habere’ non potest salvari, nisi per generationem vel corruptionem alicuius dispositionis sibi inharentis et distinctae ab ea. Sic enim est de aqua, si prius est calida et postea frigida; et de materia, si prius sit sub forma aquae et postea sub forma ignis; et de intellectu, si prius fuit sic opinatus et post contrarie. Nam homine dormiente et omni repraesentatione sibi per sensum circumscripta, adhuc aliter haberet se posterius quam haberet se prius, quod non potest salvari nisi per alietatem illarum opinionum ab invicem et ab intellectu. Aliter non posset ostendi quin omnia essent unum modo quo opinabantur Parmenides et Melissus, sicut dixi prius.”
- 26.
Later, in QDA, lib. 3, q. 16 (n. 6), Buridan quotes the relevant passage from Aristotle, Met. 5.10, 1018b7–8: “For this is what it is to be other in species: to have contrareity while being in the same genus ” (hoc enim est diversa esse specie: in eodem genere entia contarietatem habere).
- 27.
Complex mental acts are different, of course, for when we entertain simple qualities as terms in a proposition , it is a complex, namely, the proposition, which informs the intellect, not a sequence of discrete simple concepts ; otherwise we wouldn’t be able to entertain contradictory propositions. Thus, in QDA, lib. 3, q. 16 (n. 15), Buridan argues that complex concepts can have contrary or contradictory parts, such as when we form certain hypothetical propositions. Thus, the parts of the sentence, “Buridan climbed Mt. Ventoux and did not climb Mt. Ventoux,” do not annihilate each other because they are together in signification, not in being. For discussion, see Zupko (forthcoming).
- 28.
See Maier (1958, 338): “Each state and each change , each disposition (modus se habendi) and each case of being differently disposed (aliter et aliter se habere), thus signifies for Buridan a form-like accident or a form-like disposition in the subject in question. This account also holds good for local motion , which is not mentioned here [i.e. in QDA, lib. 3, q. 11], for Buridan certainly sees in it an ‘absolute ’, [i.e.] the inhering accidents of a moving body , for which this account is largely true” (my translation). To this Maier adds, “For Buridan […] [local motion ] is something internal which has a formal character and which virtually stands for an inhering quality of the mobile.”
- 29.
I noted in my 2003 book that Buridan’s use of impetus to explain phenomena outside the context of projectile motion is not without precedent. The concept of mayl (inclination ) plays a similar role in Avicenna’s psychology (Zupko 2003, 219–223). There is also an uncanny similarity between impetus and the Stoic notion of hormé (impulse) as a motion of the soul: “In genus impulse is a movement of the soul towards something. In species it is seen to include both the impulse which occurs in rational animals and the one found in the non-rational. […] [O]ne would correctly define rational impulse by saying that it is a movement of thought towards something in the sphere of action” (John Stobaeus, quoted in Long and Sedley 1987, 317). But the analogy should not be taken too far: unlike moving projectiles, intellectual motions are partly driven by free—i.e. non-natural—volitions , and so (as Buridan himself notes in response to an unnamed opponent below), they do not not wax and wane continuously, meaning that the impetus of thinking cannot be mathematized, for it fails to exhibit any quantitative regularity along a continuum.
- 30.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 15, n. 11: “Secunda conclusio est quod ille habitus non est de natura vel specie intellectionis, nec differens ab ea solum secundum intensum et remissum, ut aliqui dicunt, ita quod cum est intensum est intellectio, et cum est remissum, non amplius dicitur intellectio, sed habitus. Ista conclusio probatur, quia non existente actu intelligendi, est habitus remissus in eo qui parum studuit, ideo cito amissibilis nisi perseveret in studio. In eo autem qui longo tempore studuit, est iam habitus intensus, et difficiliter mobilis seu amissibilis, licet non sit actualis intellectio.”
- 31.
It is the view of Pseudo-Buridan, Quaestiones de anima, lib. 3, q. 10 (ed. Patar, 459–460).
- 32.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 15, n. 12: “Ponamus secundum adversarium quod intellectio sit forma intensa decem graduum eiusdem rationis, et habitus derelictus sit forma remissa quinque graduum, similiter eiusdem rationis cum illis gradibus qui erant formae intensae. Tunc igitur cessante actuali intellectione, corrumpuntur quinque gradus illius formae intensae, et constat quod cito et faciliter et quasi instanter cessat huiusmodi intellectio. Ideo sic cito et faciliter corrumpuntur illi quinque gradus. Et tamen alii quinque remanentes habitus non corrumpuntur cito, sed sunt longe permanentiae et de difficili mobiles. Huius autem diversitatis inter quinque remanentes et quinque corruptos, nullus posset assignare causam ex qua ponuntur ad invicem eiusdem rationis, et quod intellectus nullus sibi determinat. Ideo ficticia erat et falsa positio adversarii.”
- 33.
If the aim of medieval philosophers who appealed to the intension and remission of forms in this way was, as Norman Kretzmann (1977, 5) suggested, to consider “abstract problems of mensuration in terms of arbitrarily assigned degrees ranging over intensive and extensive qualities alike,” so that latitudes of forms were treated “as continua analogous to line segments and temporal intervals, degrees being the analogues for points and instants,” then one can ask whether the difference between thoughts and dispositions is purely a matter of degree. Seen in this light Buridan tries to corner his materialist opponents by not allowing them to speak vaguely of intensification and diminution, but insisting that actual (hypothetical) measures be assigned to different mental states. The result fails to identify the mechanism of change : why does the form not have the same speed of intensification/diminution between degrees 0 and 5 (qua disposition) as between degrees 5 and 10 (qua occurrent thought)? The speed distinction looks completely ad hoc.
- 34.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 15, n. 15: “Cum autem intellectus actuatus fuerit per primas intellectiones, ipse est potens actu considerare de omnibus quae ex illis primis intellectionibus vel ex similibus aliis deductis fuerint, et quorum habitus in eo remanserunt.”
- 35.
Note that Buridan’s argument for qualitatively distinct dispositions concerns the subject or medium of such objects, not the objects themselves. Thus, an act of thinking and the disposition to have that thought can both be about the same thing, even though they are distinct psychological qualities. QDA, lib. 2, q. 18, n. 44: “From the demonstration of a conclusion , such as that each triangle has three angles [equal to two right angles], there is generated in the intellect a certain state, which by its nature persists over time. And it remains in the intellect when the act of understanding has ceased and in the absence of the [understood] object” (ex demonstratione alicuius conclusionis, ut quod omnis triangulus habet tres angulos, generatur in intellectu quidam habitus, qui per tempus innatus est manere. Et manet in intellectu cessante actu intelligendi et in absentia obiecti).
- 36.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 2, q. 18, n. 16: “Species colorum in oculo et representatio coloris in fantasia vel intellectu non videntur esse eiusdem vel consimilis naturae, nec eiusdem rationis et speciei.”
- 37.
According to Aristotle in De gen. et corr. 1.7 (324a5), the agent and patient in a change must be in one sense the same and in another sense different, i.e. “generically identical (i.e. alike), but specifically unlike,” as exhibited by the reciprocal action of contraries (trans. Joachim in Aristotle 1984, 529; cf. De an. 2.5). Buridan’s own position is unclear, but I take it that at QDA, lib. 2, q. 18, n. 16—a remark that follows closely upon his discussion of real vs. spiritual being in the previous question (QDA, lib. 2, q. 17, quoted above)—he is wondering whether the species of colour in the eye and the representation of colour in the imagination or intellect really are generically proximate enough to enter into causal relations.
- 38.
John Buridan, QDA, lib. 3, q. 4, n. 27: “Ad ultimam, diceretur quod non est naturalis sed supernaturalis modus quo intellectus inhaeret corpori humano. Et certum est quod Deus supernaturaliter posset non solum formare [formam] non eductam de potentia materiae, immo etiam eductam separare a sua materia, et separatim conservare, et ponere in materiam aliam. Quare igitur hoc non esset possibile de intellectu humano?”
- 39.
I am grateful to Joël Biard , Magali Roques , and an audience at the 2014 conference of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy for comments on an earlier version of this paper, the latter half of which revises and expands a discussion in my 2003 book (219–223).
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Zupko, J. (2018). Acts and Dispositions in John Buridan’s Faculty Psychology. In: Faucher, N., Roques, M. (eds) The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00235-0_18
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