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A Taxonomy of Side Channel Attacks on Critical Infrastructures and Relevant Systems

  • Nick Tsalis
  • Efstratios Vasilellis
  • Despina Mentzelioti
  • Theodore Apostolopoulos
Chapter
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)

Abstract

Information disclosure leads to serious exploits, disruption or damage of critical operations and privacy breaches, both in Critical Infrastructures (CIs) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and in traditional IT systems. Side channel attacks in computer security refer to attacks on data confidentiality through information gained from the physical implementation of a system, rather an attack on the algorithm or software itself. Depending on the source and the type of information leakage, certain general types of side channel attacks have been established: power, electromagnetic, cache, timing, sensor-based, acoustic and memory analysis attacks. Given the sensitive nature of ICS and the vast amount of information stored on IT systems, consequences of side channel attacks can be quite significant. In this paper, we present an extensive survey on side channel attacks that can be implemented either on ICS or traditional systems often used in Critical Infrastructure environments. Presented taxonomies try to take into consideration all major publications of the last decade and present them using three different classification systems to provide an objective form of multi-level taxonomy and a potentially profitable statistical approach. We conclude by discussing open issues and challenges in this context and outline possible future research directions.

General Terms

Security Privacy Side channel attacks ICS Critical infrastructures Timing Electromagnetic Sensor IT Cryptography Cache 

Keywords

Side channel attack Classification Category Targeted hardware Targeted software Critical infrastructure 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nick Tsalis
    • 1
  • Efstratios Vasilellis
    • 1
  • Despina Mentzelioti
    • 1
  • Theodore Apostolopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security & Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFOSEC) Laboratory Department of InformaticsAthens University of Economics & BusinessAthensGreece

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