Safety Process Improvement with POSE and Alloy

  • Derek Mannering
  • Jon G. Hall
  • Lucia Rapanotti

Safety Standards demand that industrial applications demonstrate they have the required safety integrity and this starts with the initial requirements phase. This paper shows how the Problem Oriented Software Engineering (POSE) framework, in conjunction with the Alloy formal method, supports this task through its ability to elaborate, transform and analyse the project requirements and thus develop a solution for an avionics case study. In particular, this work reports on how the POSE/Alloy combination was used in conjunction with the POSE safety pattern to improve the requirements analysis capabilities of an existing, successful safety critical development process.


System Safety Safety Requirement Safety Property Requirement Engineer Requirement Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Derek Mannering
    • 1
  • Jon G. Hall
    • 2
  • Lucia Rapanotti
    • 2
  1. 1.General Dynamics UK LimitedUK
  2. 2.Centre for Research in ComputingThe Open UniversityMilton KeynesUK

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