Argument Based Contract Enforcement

  • Nir Oren
  • Alun Preece
  • Timothy J. Norman
Conference paper


Agents may choose to ignore contract violations if the costs of enforcing the contract exceed the compensation they would receive. In this paper we describe an argumentation based framework for agents to both decide whether to enforce a contract, and to undertake contract enforcement actions. The framework centres around agents presenting beliefs to justify their position, and backing up these beliefs with facts as necessary. Presenting facts costs an agent utility, and our framework operates by using a reasoning mechanism which is based on the agent comparing the utility it would gain for proving a set of literals with the costs incurred during this process.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nir Oren
    • 1
  • Alun Preece
    • 1
  • Timothy J. Norman
  1. 1.Department of Computing ScienceUniversity of AbedeenAberdeenScotland

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