Evaluating Two-Stage Network Structures: Bargaining Game Approach

  • Juan Du
  • Yao Chen
  • Wade D. Cook
  • Liang Liang
  • Joe Zhu
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 208)

Abstract

This chapter presents a Nash bargaining game model to measure the performance of two-stage decision making units (DMUs) in data envelopment analysis (DEA). The two stages are viewed as players to bargain for a better payoff, which is represented by DEA ratio efficiency score. The efficiency model is developed as a cooperative game model. It is shown that when only one intermediate measure exists between the two stages, the newly-developed bargaining approach yields the same results as applying the standard DEA approach to each stage separately.

Keywords

Data envelopment analysis Efficiency Nash bargaining game Two-stage structure 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juan Du
    • 1
  • Yao Chen
    • 2
  • Wade D. Cook
    • 3
  • Liang Liang
    • 4
  • Joe Zhu
    • 5
  1. 1.School of Economics and ManagementTongji UniversityShanghaiP.R. China
  2. 2.Manning School of BusinessUniversity of Massachusetts at LowellLowellUSA
  3. 3.Schulich School of BusinessYork UniversityTorontoCanada
  4. 4.School of ManagementUniversity of Science and Technology of ChinaHefeiP.R. China
  5. 5.School of BusinessWorcester Polytechnic InstituteWorcesterUSA

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