Differences Between Industries in the Definition of Acceptable Risk

  • John C. Chicken
  • S. A. Harbison
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Risk Analysis book series (AIRA, volume 6)

Abstract

This paper aims to identify and assess the differences that exist in the way acceptable risks are defined and proved in different industries. The paper is divided into five main parts: (1) the definition of acceptable risk in the nuclear industry, (2) the definition of acceptable risk in other industries, (3) reasons why certain levels of risk appear acceptable, (4) ways in which acceptability requirements are satisfied and (5) the cost implications of reducing risk. The final part of the paper speculates on possible future developments.

Keywords

Acceptable risks nuclear comparison of industries 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Deadly Meltdown, Time,pp. 7–15, May 12, 1986.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    The Bhopal Poison Gas Disaster, The Financial Times,p. 2, December 2, 1985.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    No Easy Answer, India Still Faces Risk of Industrial Disasters a Year After Bhopal, The Wall Street Journal, p. 1 and 22, December 3, 1985.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    P. Lagadec, Major Technological Risk, pp. 35–75, Pergamon Press, Oxford, (1982).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    European Community Directive on the Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, Official Journal of the European Community,82/501/EECd, L230 (1982).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    J. C. Chicken, Risk Assessment for Hazardous Installations, published for the Commission of the European Communities, p. 29, Pergamon Press Oxford, (1986).Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Nuclear Safety H. M. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Power Reactors, Fourth Impression 1983, published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    The Range of Risks from a PWR at Sizewell - An Overview, Evidence presented by H. M. NH to the Sizewell `B’ Power Station Inquiry, NII/S/92(SAF) (July 1984).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    S. A. Harbison, G. N. Kelly, and C. R. Hemming, Procedures to Relate the NII Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Reactors to Risk, NRPB - R180, published by the National Radiological Protection Board, Didcot, Oxon (April 1985).Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    S. A. Harbison and G. N. Kelly, An Interpretation of the Nuclear Inspectorate’s Safety Assessment Principles for Accidental Releases, paper presented at the IAEA seminar on implications of probabilistic risk assessment, Blackpool (March 1985).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Status Report on Safety Goals/Objectives, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, XII/476/83 (May 1983).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    J. C. Chicken, Risk Assessment for Hazardous Installations, Op Cit, pp. 33–41.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    First Report of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, Second Impression, p. 12 (1976).Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Health and Safety Executive Report, A Reappraisal of the HSE Safety Evaluation of the Proposed St. Fergus to Moss Morran LNG Pipeline, ( September 1980 ).Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Canvey, A Second Report, A Review of Potential Hazards from Operations in the Canvey Island/Thurrock Area Three Years After the Publication of the Canvey Report, published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, pp. 14–15, London (1981).Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    J. C. Chicken, Risk Assessment for Hazardous Installations, Op Cit., pp. 45–48.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Appendix 2, “Dealing With Risks,” of the Environmental Program of the Netherlands 1986–1990 established by three Ministries and edited by the Central Department for Information and International Relations.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    J. C. Chicken, Risk Assessment for Hazardous Installations, Op Cit., pp. 58–100.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    E. Ashby, Reconciling Man with the Environment,pp. 69–72, Oxford University Press, London.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    J. C. Chicken and M. R. Hayns, Development of the Non-Dimensional Method of Ranking Risks, in Risk Assessment and Management, pp. 481–490, Lester B. Lave, ed., Plenum Press, New York (1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    J. H. Crowley and D. Griffith, U.S. Construction Cost Rise Threatens Nuclear Option, Nuclear Engineering International, pp. 25–28 (June 1982).Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    The Impact of the Sholly versus NRC Decision, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the United States Senate, Ninety Seventh Congress, First Session, March 1981, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington (1981).Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    The Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report on the CEGB and the Reasons for the Delays and Cost Increases in the Construction of the AGR Power Stations, HG 315 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London (1981).Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Whoops: How It Happened, Duns Business Month, pp. 48–58 (October 1983).Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    P. Hall, Great Planning Disasters, p. 7, Penguin Books (1980).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • John C. Chicken
    • 1
  • S. A. Harbison
    • 2
  1. 1.J. C. Consultancy Ltd.UK
  2. 2.H. M. Nuclear Installations InspectorateUK

Personalised recommendations