Learning via Model Construction and Criticism

Protocol Evidence on Sources of Creativity in Science
  • John Clement
Part of the Perspectives on Individual Differences book series (PIDF)


There is growing recognition that mental models play a fundamental role in the comprehension of science concepts. The process of learning via model construction appears to be central to theory formation in science and central for science instruction but is still very poorly understood. This chapter uses evidence from case studies, in which a scientist is asked to think out loud, to argue that nonformal reasoning processes that are neither deductive nor inductive can play an important role in scientific model construction. The construction process is complex and involves repeated passes through a cycle of hypothesis generation, evaluation, and modification.


Model Construction Explanatory Model Scientific Model Analogous Case Hypothesis Formation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Clement
    • 1
  1. 1.Scientific Reasoning Research InstituteUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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