Supply Chain Contracting and Coordination with Stochastic Demand

  • Martin A. Lariviere

Abstract

Recent years have seen a growing interest among both academics and practitioners in the field of supply chain management. With that has come a growing body of work on supply chain contracts. Few firms are so large and few products so simple that one organization can manage the entire provision of the good. Rather, most supply chains require the coordination of independently managed entities who seek to maximize their own profits. Issues of who controls what decisions and how parties will be compensated become critical. An understanding of contractual forms and their economic implications is therefore an important part of evaluating supply chain performance.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin A. Lariviere
    • 1
  1. 1.Fuqua School of BusinessDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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