Japan’s Financial Big Bang: Its Impact on the Legal System and Corporate Governance

  • Hideki Kanda
Chapter
Part of the Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions book series (IFMI, volume 12)

Abstract

The impact of Japan’s financial Big Bang on the legal system and corporate governance in Japan is examined in this chapter. The Big Bang program moves the Japanese regulatory environment and institutional structure toward the Western model, particularly the US model, by emphasizing the role of capital markets in resource allocation. Whether it also leads to changes in the legal system and corporate governance is another matter. I argue that in some respects it already does, but in other respects it will not.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Legal System Capital Market Mutual Fund Legal Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hideki Kanda
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TokyoJapan

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