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The Environmental Impact of Public Utility Regulation: Kern County and the Case of the Missing Gas Pipelines

  • Jerome Ellig
Chapter
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 10)

Abstract

The past decade has seen a stream of literature documenting how environmental regulation affects the economy (e.g., Crandall (1983), Maloney and McCormick (1982), Pashigian (1985)). Less often have scholars analyzed the myriad ways that economic regulation affects the environment. In the traditional “regulated industries,” such as gas pipelines and power companies, regulatory commissions most often focus on assuring adequate service at “just and reasonable” prices./ Rate regulation, in turn, begets barriers to entry and supervision of service expansion as policymakers strive to preserve cross-subsidies (Posner 1972;Crew and Rowley 1988), protect non-sustainable natural monopolies (MacAvoy, Spulber, and Stangle 1989, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1985, 223–24), encourage investment in customer-specific assets (Goldberg 1976), or prevent inflation of the rate base (Averch and Johnson 1962;Wellisz 1963; Baumol and Klevorick 1970).

Keywords

Emission Factor Steam Generator Nitrogen Oxide Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Nitrogen Oxide Emission 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jerome Ellig

There are no affiliations available

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