Determinants of The Selection of Full or Limited Tort Auto Insurance in Pennsylvania: an Empirical Analysis

  • Laureen Regan
Chapter
Part of the Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security book series (HSRI, volume 24)

Abstract

In response to rapidly rising insurance prices, Pennsylvania was one of several states to adopt no-fault auto insurance in the 1970s. The Pennsylvania no-fault law, passed in 1975, included a $750 monetary tort threshold and unlimited no-fault medical benefits. However, because of the easily reached tort threshold, the new law failed to stabilize costs; and so, in 1984 the legislature acted again, this time repealing the tort threshold, while leaving in place an “add-on” system of no-fault “CAT Fund” benefits capped at $1,000,000 (see Powers, 1989).

Keywords

Insurance Price Bodily Injury Tort System Loss Cost Injured Party 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laureen Regan
    • 1
  1. 1.Temple UniversityTempleUSA

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