The Effect of Information on Payoff in Kleptoparasitic Interactions
We model stealing interactions as a Producer–Scrounger game in an extensive form where one individual, the scrounger, may attempt to steal a valuable item from another, the producer, who may in turn defend it. The population is not homogeneous, but rather the individuals may place a different value on the same resource. The difference in valuation causes the appearance of several informational situations; in this paper we consider three main ones: (1) individuals are aware of their own as well as their opponent’s valuation, (2) individuals are aware only of their own valuation, and (3) individuals are not aware even of their own valuation. We study the effect of information availability on the scrounger’s payoff. We not only show that situation (1) is never worse than (2), but we also demonstrate that situation (3) can be worse than (1) and (2) for some parameters, but can be better than (1) and (2) for other values.
KeywordsFull Information Expected Payoff Partial Information Extensive Form Information Case
The research was supported by NSF grants DMS-0850465 and DBI-0926288, Simons Foundation grant 245400 and UNCG Undergraduate Research Award in Mathematics and Statistics.
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