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Delusion and Double Book-Keeping

  • Louis A. SassEmail author

Abstract

This chapter introduces Jaspers’ understanding of delusion with regard to the question of comprehensibility and incomprehensibility. After a historical introduction, the characteristic feature of derealization is discussed and related to what Bleuler called “double book-keeping.” Then, the methodological relevance of phenomenology and the similarity between delusional states and phenomenological imagination and bracketing (as emphasized by authors such as Blankenburg) are discussed. Different stances taken toward the world already in the realm of the natural attitude can be described within the Schutzian framework of “multiple realities.” This framework is analyzed with regard to the notion of double book-keeping. It shows that some elements of schizophrenic experience can be seen—in Heideggerian terms—to preserve and reveal something about human authenticity.

Keywords

Delusion Double book-keeping Derealization Imagination Epoche 

Notes

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments on drafts of this article, the author thanks Greg Byrom and Nev Jones.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Applied and Professional PsychologyRutgers UniversityPiscatawayUSA

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