Nanoelectronics and Hardware Security

  • Garrett S. Rose
  • Dhireesha Kudithipudi
  • Ganesh Khedkar
  • Nathan McDonald
  • Bryant Wysocki
  • Lok-Kwong Yan
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 55)

Abstract

In recent years, the field of nanoelectronics has yielded several nanoscale device families that exhibit the high device densities and energy-efficient operation required for emerging integrated circuit applications. For example, the memristor (or “memory resistor”) is a two-terminal nanoelectronic switch particularly well suited for applications such as high-density reconfigurable computing and neuromorphic hardware. In addition to increased device densities and energy-efficient operation, nanoelectronic systems are also subject to a high degree of variability, often seen as a negative for conventional circuit designs. However, in terms of implementing certain security primitives, variability is a feature that can be harnessed to improve security and trust in integrated circuits. The focus of this chapter is the utilization of nanoelectronic hardware for improved hardware security in emerging nanoelectronic and hybrid CMOS-nanoelectronic processors. Specifically, features such as variability and low power dissipation can be harnessed for side-channel attack mitigation, improved encryption/decryption and anti-tamper design. Furthermore, the novel behavior of nanoelectronic devices can be harnessed for novel computer architectures that are naturally immune to many conventional cyber attacks. For example, chaos computing utilizes chaotic oscillators in the hardware implementation of a computing system such that operations are inherently chaotic and thus difficult to decipher.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Garrett S. Rose
    • 1
  • Dhireesha Kudithipudi
    • 2
  • Ganesh Khedkar
    • 2
  • Nathan McDonald
    • 1
  • Bryant Wysocki
    • 1
  • Lok-Kwong Yan
    • 1
  1. 1.Information DirectorateAir Force Research LaboratoryRomeUSA
  2. 2.NanoComputing Research Lab, Department of Computer EngineeringRochester Institute of TechnologyRochesterUSA

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