Improving Defense Against Intelligent Adversaries

  • Louis Anthony CoxJr.
Chapter
First Online:
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 185)

Abstract

This is the first of four chapters devoted to public-sector applications of risk analysis and possible ways to improve them. The applications we consider are defending against attacks by terrorists or other intelligent adversaries (this chapter), assessing and promoting food safety (next chapter), and assessing the public health benefits and fairness of cleaner air (Chaps. 7 and 8). These exemplify the roles of government in providing public goods, enforcing product safety, and reducing negative externalities, respectively. Risk analysis is now used extensively in each of these areas to help allocate resources and set priorities in pursuing these roles with limited budgets.

Keywords

Expected Loss Initial Attack Game Tree Successful Attack Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Louis Anthony Cox, Jr 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Louis Anthony CoxJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.Cox AssociatesDenverUSA

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