Incentive-Aware Opportunistic Network Routing

  • Greg BigwoodEmail author
  • Tristan Henderson


Opportunistic networking relies on cooperation between nodes to perform efficiently. Opportunistic routing protocols depend on nodes forwarding messages for each other, as otherwise the only delivery mechanism would be for the creator of a message to encounter the message destination node and deliver the message directly. Cooperative forwarding, however, incurs a cost to the forwarding nodes, both in terms of energy and storage, as nodes need to dedicate resources to forwarding. Due to these costs, nodes may wish to avoid the costs associated with participation in an opportunistic network, by not forwarding messages for other nodes. We discuss several attacks on opportunistic routing, and in particular, focus on selfishness of nodes. We discuss incentive mechanisms for opportunistic routing, before concluding with a discussion of some of the outstanding challenges in this area.


Delivery Ratio Incentive Mechanism Forwarding Node Forwarding Path Selfish Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St AndrewsFifeUK

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