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A Turnpike Theory for Infinite Horizon Open-Loop Differential Games with Decoupled Controls

  • D. Carlson
  • A. Haurie
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 3)

Abstract

This paper deals with a class of open-loop differential games played over an infinite time horizon. The equilibrium concept is defined in the sense of overtaking optimal responses by the players to the program choices of the opponents. We extend to this dynamic game framework the results obtained by Rosen for concave static games. We prove existence, uniqueness and asymptotic stability (also called the turnpike property) of overtaking equilibrium programs for a class of games satisfying a strong concavity assumption (strict diagonal concavity).

Keywords

Asymptotic Stability Differential Game Dynamic Game Global Asymptotic Stability Infinite Horizon 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Birkhäuser Boston 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. Carlson
    • 1
  • A. Haurie
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Dept. of MathematicsUniversity of ToledoToledoUSA
  2. 2.Dept. of Management StudiesUniversity of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland
  3. 3.GERAD-Ecole des HECMontréalCanada

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