Regulation of Energy Industries

  • Subhes C. BhattacharyyaEmail author


This chapter introduces the concepts related to the regulation of energy industries. It first presents the traditional regulation, followed by the modern concepts of regulation (incentive regulation). The pros and cons of each alternative are discussed as well.


Traditional regulation Incentive regulation Rate of return Asset base Price cap Revenue cap Yardstick competition 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Energy and Sustainable DevelopmentDe Montfort UniversityLeicesterUK

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