Participation and Efficiency in the New York Financial Transmission Rights Markets

  • Seabron Adamson
  • Geoffrey Parker
Part of the Lecture Notes in Energy book series (LNEN, volume 7)


As many authors have observed, the allocation of scarce transmission capacity presents a major market design challenge. The electric power system is subject to generation and transmission technology constraints that make it difficult to define tradable property rights for physical transmission. This difficulty has led economists to instead create markets for financial transmission rights (FTRs) settled against the congestion price component of locational marginal prices (LMPs) (Hogan 1992). This market structure has been increasingly adopted in the United States and other countries.


Marketing Volatility Dispatch Hedging 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tulane Energy InstituteTulane UniversityNew OrleansUSA

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