SAFECOMP ’93 pp 219-229 | Cite as

Robust Requirements Specifications for Safety—Critical Systems

  • Amer Saeed
  • Rogério de Lemos
  • Tom Anderson
Conference paper


Experience in safety-critical systems has shown that deviations from assumed behaviour can and do cause accidents. This suggests that the development of requirements specifications for such systems should be supported with a risk analysis. In this paper we present an approach to the development of robust requirements specifications (i.e. specifications that are adequate for the risks involved), based on qualitative and quantitative analyses.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amer Saeed
    • 1
  • Rogério de Lemos
    • 1
  • Tom Anderson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computing ScienceUniversity of NewcastleNewcastle upon TyneUK

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