The Ammunition Control System

  • Paul Mukherjee
  • John Fitzgerald
Chapter
Part of the Formal Approaches to Computing and Information Technology (FACIT) book series (FACIT)

Summary

Proving properties of a specification can deepen our knowledge of the specification, leading to clearer specifications, and more elegant and efficient designs. In this chapter we use an existing specification (Mukherjee and Stavridou’s model of UN regulations for safe storage of explosives) to illustrate this idea. In particular we demonstrate how to discharge a satisfiability proof obligation, and how to prove the correctness of a specification modification. We see that both proofs further our understanding of the specification and the system itself.

Keywords

Auxiliary Function Proof Obligation Correct Type Compatibility Relation Proof Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  1. [1]
    J.C. Bicarregui, J.S. Fitzgerald, P.A. Lindsay, R. Moore, and B. Ritchie. Proof in VDM: A Practitioner’s Guide. Springer-Verlag, 1994.Google Scholar
  2. [2]
    Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, New York. Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 5th revised edition, 1988.Google Scholar
  3. [3]
    R. Elmstrpm, P.G. Larsen, and P.B. Lassen. The IFAD VDM-SL Toolbox: A Practical Approach to Formal Specifications. ACM Sigplan Notices, 29 (9), 1994.Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    J. S. Fitzgerald. A proof of Satisfiability in Mukherjee and Stavridou’s Ammunition Control System. Technical Report 616, Dept. of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK, 1997.Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    J. Goguen and T. Winkler. Introducing OBJ. Technical Report SRI-CSL88–9, SRI International, August 1988.Google Scholar
  6. [6]
    I. Lakatos. Proofs and Refutations Cambridge University Press, 1976.Google Scholar
  7. [7]
    P. Mukherjee. Proof of Equivalence in the ACS specification. Technical Report SCS 97.34, University of Leeds, 1997.Google Scholar
  8. [8]
    P. Mukherjee and V. Stavridou. The Formal Specification of Safety Requirements for Storing Explosives. Formal Aspects of Computing, 5 (4): 299–336, 1993.MATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Mukherjee
  • John Fitzgerald

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations