Safe Comp 97 pp 197-209 | Cite as

Computer Based Support for Standards and Processes in Safety Critical Systems

  • S. P. Wilson
  • J. A. McDermid
  • P. M. Kirkham
  • C. H. Pygott
  • D. J. Tombs


This paper describes an approach and tool-set, the Safety Argument Manager (SAM), that can be used to support standards and processes in the area of Safety Critical Systems. We take an example standard (for military fuzing systems) and a mandated process for showing conformance to particular aspects of that standard, and demonstrate how SAM can support them. In particular SAM can help manage conformance to the standard and process, and provide detailed automated checks between the steps of the process. We argue that using such support gives increased assurance that a system has been built in a way that conforms to the planned process, and that the integrity of the system will be at the level required.


Operating Logic Goal Structure Consistency Rule Fault Tree Analysis Safety Critical System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. P. Wilson
    • 1
  • J. A. McDermid
    • 1
  • P. M. Kirkham
    • 1
  • C. H. Pygott
    • 2
  • D. J. Tombs
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of YorkYorkUK
  2. 2.Defence Evaluation and Research AgencyMalvernUK

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