Household Economic Behaviors pp 1-40 | Cite as

# Nonunitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature

## Abstract

This chapter considers nonunitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient, and noncooperative (or strategic) models, which are based on the concept of Cournot–Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.

## Keywords

Households Collective model Strategic model Testability Identification## References

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