OF-FMEA: an approach to safety analysis of object-oriented software intensive systems

  • Tadeusz Cichocki
  • Janusz Górski
Conference paper
Part of the The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science book series (SECS, volume 752)

Abstract

The paper presents an extension to the common FMEA method in such a way that it can be applied to safety analysis of systems,(hardware and software) that are developed using a recently popular object oriented approach. The method makes use of the object and collaboration models of UML. It assumes that the system components are specified formally using the CSP notation. The method supports systematic way of failure mode identification and validation. Selected failure modes are injected to the specification of “normal” behaviour and their consequences are analysed with the help of an automatic tool. The verification process provides hints for possible redesign of components. Experiences of using the method for a railway signalling case study are also reported.

Keywords

Safety critical systems FMEA formal analysis 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tadeusz Cichocki
    • 1
  • Janusz Górski
    • 2
  1. 1.Bombardier Transportation (Zwus) Polska Sp. zo.o.KatowicePoland
  2. 2.Gdańsk University of TechnologyGdańskPoland

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