Procurement Network Formation: A Cooperative Game Approach

Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 152)


In this chapter, we are interested in a procurement network formation problem. We present a case for modelling the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game. We investigate recent results in shortest path cooperative games and their implications to the procurement network formation problem. We then enhance the model for procurement network formation by incorporating asymmetry in the information that agents have. Specifically, we model the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game with incomplete information. We point out the incentive compatible core as an appropriate solution concept for this category of games. We then review the current state of the art on the topic of incentive compatible core, pose a conjecture and end with some directions for future work.


Supply Chain Incomplete Information Cooperative Game Grand Coalition Market Maker 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer New York 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and AutomationIndian Institute of ScienceBangaloreIndia

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