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Hardware Trojan Detection

  • Seetharam Narasimhan
  • Swarup Bhunia
Chapter

Abstract

Emerging trend of outsourcing the design and fabrication services to external facilities as well as increasing reliance on third-party Intellectual Property (IP) cores and electronic design automation tools makes integrated circuits (ICs) increasingly vulnerable to hardware Trojan attacks at different stages of its life-cycle. Figure 15.1 shows the modern IC design, fabrication, test, and deployment stages highlighting the level of trust at each stage. This scenario raises a new set of challenges for trust validation with respect to malicious design modification at various stages of an IC life-cycle, where untrusted components/personnel are involved [1]. In particular, it brings in the requirement for reliable detection of malicious design modification made in an untrusted fabrication facility, during post-manufacturing test. It also imposes a requirement for trust validation in IP cores obtained from untrusted thirdparty vendors.

Keywords

Intellectual Property Test Vector Path Delay Switching Activity Automatic Test Pattern Generation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Case Western Reserve UniversityClevelandUSA

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