The Market as Criminal and Criminals in the Market: Reducing Opportunities for Organised Crime in the International Antiquities Market

  • Simon Mackenzie


What is the relationship between organised crime and the antiquities market? There are two senses in which we can use the term “organised crime” here. In the first sense, we can see the international market in illicit antiquities as a criminal market (Polk 2000), organised into a structure of relations between thieves, smugglers, facilitators, sellers, and buyers of illicit commodities. We might therefore suggest that this illicit part of the trade is an example of “organised” crime. That argument could proceed without reference to the presence of conventionally stereotyped organised criminals in the market, in the sense of groups or networks of professional criminals who use violence and corruption in the pursuit of illegal financial gain.


Organise Criminal Organise Crime Cultural Object Market Country Sector Vulnerability 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice ResearchUniversity of GlasgowGlasgowUK

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