Tacit Knowledge Structures in the Negotiation Process

Chapter

Abstract

International negotiations, like all interpersonal processes, are shaped by the knowledge structures and cognitive assumptions of each of the participants. These cognitive processes are generally tacit or implicit in nature, that is, they are not identifiable and describable by those who hold them. Perhaps for that reason they exert an especially powerful influence on both the process and outcome of negotiations because they cannot easily be countered. In this chapter we identify and describe certain aspects of tacit knowledge structures that may play a large, but not understood, part in the negotiation process.

Keywords

Depression Expense Metaphor Glean 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyKent State UniversityKentUSA

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