The Risk of Risk Analysis And its Relation to the Economics of Insider Threats

  • Christian W. ProbstEmail author
  • Jeffrey Hunker
Conference paper


Insider threats to organizational information security are widely viewed as an important concern, but little is understood as to the pattern of their occurrence. We outline an argument for explaining what originally surprised us: that many practitioners report that their organizations take basic steps to prevent insider attacks, but do not attempt to address more serious attacks. We suggest that an understanding of the true cost of additional policies to control insider threats, and the dynamic nature of potential insider threats together help explain why this observed behavior is economically rational. This conclusion also suggests that further work needs to be done to understand how better to change underlying motivations of insiders, rather than simply focus on controlling and monitoring their behavior.


Risk Analysis Access Control Trust Relationship Gain Function Senior Executive 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Technical University of Denmark Denmark
  2. 2.Jeffrey Hunker Associates  

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