The Demand for Aggressive Behavior in American Stock Car Racing

Chapter
Part of the Sports Economics, Management and Policy book series (SEMP, volume 4)

Abstract

Aggressive driving is an inherent feature of auto racing, and nowhere more so than in NASCAR’s Sprint Cup Series. This chapter explores the role that aggressive driving plays in the demand for NASCAR racing in the USA. We ­examine a set of models that estimate the impact of aggressive driving, including the accidents that often are its result, on the size of the Sprint Cup television audience. Our results indicate that aggressive driving is a very important determinant of fan demand. After controlling for the availability of substitutes, the anticipated speed and closeness of competition, a variety of institutional parameters, and other variables that are likely to affect viewers’ choices, we find evidence that the degree of aggressive driving is positively related to the number of people watching Sprint Cup broadcasts in the pre-chase era, and that the effects are both quantitatively large and statistically significant.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Craig Depken for valuable comments, Carly Litzenberger of the Nielsen Company for assistance with the data, and Matthias Franzen for diligent research assistance. Peter von Allmen gratefully acknowledges funding support from the Moravian College Amrhein Faculty Development Fund.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Skidmore CollegeSaratoga SpringsUSA
  2. 2.University of IowaIowa CityUSA

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