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Uncertainty and Risk Management in Cyber Situational Awareness

  • Jason Li
  • Xinming Ou
  • Raj Rajagopalan
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Information Security book series (ADIS, volume 46)

Abstract

Handling cyber threats unavoidably needs to deal with both uncertain and imprecise information. What we can observe as potential malicious activities can seldom give us 100% confidence on important questions we care about, e.g. what machines are compromised and what damage has been incurred. In security planning, we need information on how likely a vulnerability can lead to a successful compromise to better balance security and functionality, performance, and ease of use. These information are at best qualitative and are often vague and imprecise. In cyber situational awareness, we have to rely on such imperfect information to detect real attacks and to prevent an attack from happening through appropriate risk management. This chapter surveys existing technologies in handling uncertainty and risk management in cyber situational awareness.

Keywords

Bayesian Network Intrusion Detection Intrusion Detection System Conditional Probability Table Enterprise Network 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag US 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jason Li
    • 1
  • Xinming Ou
    • 2
  • Raj Rajagopalan
    • 3
  1. 1.Intelligent Automation, Inc.Please Provide CityPlease Provide Country
  2. 2.Kansas State UniversityKansasUSA
  3. 3.HP LabsPlease Provide CityPlease Provide Country

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