The Holy War

  • Robert Mallett
Chapter
Part of the The Making of the 20th Century book series (MATWCE)

Abstract

Indignation played a significant part in driving Mussolini’s war in East Africa forward. Following Eden’s failed mission to Rome in June 1935, a campaign by the fascist-controlled Italian press whipped up national resentment against British ‘perfidy’, claiming that London’s imperial interests, as opposed to pro-League idealism, best explained Britain’s efforts to prevent Italy claiming its rightful place in the sun. When the League of Nations, in the wake of Samuel Hoare’s rousing 11 September speech at Geneva — which, vocally at least, committed Britain to collective action against Italy should the League decree it — imposed limited economic sanctions on Italy it effectively handed Mussolini even more priceless propaganda material. The British, possessors of the world’s largest empire, were now preventing Italy from securing even small-scale territorial gains in a remote part of Africa, and using the League of Nations to do so.1

Keywords

British Government Suez Canal French Government Economic Sanction Negotiate Settlement 
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Notes

  1. 4.
    For a succinct analysis of British policy-making and the sanctions question see Morewood, ‘The Chiefs of Staff’, pp. 84–8; see also A. L. Goldman, ‘Sir Robert Vansittart’s Search for Italian cooperation against Hitler, 1933–36’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9, 3 (1988), pp. 93–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 16.
    R. Klibansky (ed.), Mussolini Memoirs (Phoenix Press, London, 2000), p. 174; DGFP, C, IV, 246 and 322.Google Scholar
  3. 17.
    R. H. Whealey, ‘Mussolini’s Ideological Diplomacy: An Unpublished Document’, Journal of Modern History, 39, 4 (1967), pp. 432–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 40.
    M. Funke, ‘Le relazioni italo-tedesche al momento del conflitto etiopico e delle sanzioni della Societa delle Nazioni’, Storia Contemporanea, anno 2, 3 (1975), p. 488; Funke shows that German coal shipments increased from 5.4 million tons in 1934 to 11.3 million in 1935.Google Scholar
  5. 44.
    J. C. Robertson, ‘The Hoare-Laval Plan’, Journal of Contemporary History, 10, 3 (1975), pp. 445–51; Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution p. 238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 46.
    A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale. La conquista dell’ Impero (Mondadori, Milan, 1992), pp. 487–97.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Robert Mallett 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Mallett

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