Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts pp 139-153

Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLA, volume 41)

Social Reality and Institutional Facts: Sociality Within and Without Intentionality

  • Robert A. Wilson

John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality (1995) offers an account of the nature of social reality that complements and builds on the views of language and mind that Searle has developed in his earlier books (Searle 1969, 1983, 1992). It shares with those books a combination of a high level of both philosophical rigor and accessibility, and takes the reader down a persuasive path from the basic questions “What is social reality?” and “What are institutional facts?” to Searle’s detailed answer to these questions.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert A. Wilson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AlbertaEdmontonCanada

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