Coordinating User and Device Behavior in Wireless Grids

  • Lee W. McKnight
  • William Lehr
  • James Howison

The evolution of computing is characterized by decentralization and decreasing institutional control over resources. Wireless Grids, that is, fixed and mobile ad-hoc resource sharing networks, are challenging environments in which users strategic behaviors are crucial to system performance. We review the mechanisms employed to regulate strategic behavior online-technical, social, legal and economic-and discuss trends in their operation and application in distributed wireless grid computing.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lee W. McKnight
    • 1
  • William Lehr
    • 2
  • James Howison
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Information StudiesSyracuse University
  2. 2.Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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