The Failure of Coordination: The Siege of Antwerp and the First Battle of Ypres

Abstract

Although subsumed into an alliance strategy in the turmoil of the opening days of the war, Britain’s strategic interests on the northern flank soon reasserted their psychological pull upon the nation’s political and military leaders. In the battle of the Marne these interests were not directly at stake, yet in saving the allied cause the battle served Britain’s political ends and justified the government’s military policy of full support to France. France had staved off defeat, the German advance on Paris had been checked and a large area of invaded French territory had been recovered. However, German resistance on the river Aisne left Joffre’s task incomplete. Paris remained vulnerable if the allied battle line was outflanked, while France’s northern départements remained in German hands. To compel the German armies to resume their retirement Joffre sought to outflank the German position by forming a new French army on the left of the allied line. So began the successive flanking manoeuvres of late September and early October 1914 known as ‘the race to the sea’.¹