Search Theory

  • P. Diamond
Part of the The New Palgrave book series (NPA)

Abstract

Walrasian analysis presumes that resource allocation can be adequately modelled using the assumption of instantaneous and costless coordination of trade. In contrast, Search Theory is the analysis of resource allocation with specified, imperfect technologies for informing agents of their trading opportunities and for bringing together potential traders. The modelling advantages of assuming a frictionless coordination mechanism, plus years of hard work, permit Walrasian analysis to work with very general specifications of individual preferences and production technologies. In contrast, search theorists have explored a variety of special allocation mechanisms together with very simple preferences and production technologies. Lacking more general theories, we examine the catalogue of analyses that have been completed.

Keywords

Arrival Rate Equilibrium Price Search Cost Unemployment Spell Walrasian Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • P. Diamond

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