Abstract
The title ‘cooperative games’ would be better termed games in coalitional form. The theory of games originally developed different conceptual forms, together with their associated solution concepts, namely, games in extensive form, in strategic form and in coalitional form (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). The game in strategic form is sometimes referred to as the game in normal form, while that in coalitional form is also referred to as the game in characteristic form.
Keywords
Game Theory Cooperative Game Extensive Form Exchange Economy Coalitional Form
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989