Abstract
Janus-like, Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues had to look to both peace and war. This fundamental ambiguity was the defining characteristic of the War Cabinet’s predicament and it influenced all aspects of the invasion crisis. It not only accounted for the uncertainty which distinguished the transitional stage in what had become a national political drama, it also meant that the War Cabinet had to develop two separate but closely related policies, one designed to serve diplomatic goals, the other to serve military objectives. Each was governed by its own dynamics and each was produced by its own combination of authors, although the members of the War Cabinet provided a common link. The structure of the crisis and the political leadership of the War Cabinet ensured, however, that military policy had priority and that diplomacy was ultimately subordinate to the requirements of the military campaign.
Keywords
Prime Minister Security Council Falkland Island Security Council Resolution Peaceful SettlementPreview
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Notes
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