Abstract
The armistices that brought the great war to an end did not and could not bring about the peace that was so generally desired. It was not even the case that all hostilities had ceased. The Russian civil war, merging as it did into wars between the new soviet regime and parts of what had formerly been the Russian empire; the struggles between the newly emancipated countries of eastern Europe over boundary claims, the unreconciled conflict between Greek and Turk; the problem of the succession to Turkish rule in the Arab lands — all these were to be productive of continued armed struggles on a greater or lesser scale from which the world would not enjoy a general breathing space for another four years and more. In some of these struggles Britain was directly involved, as in the intervention in Russia that had begun on several fronts in 1918. From none could she afford to be aloof, since no country had a greater interest in a restoration of general tranquillity and a resumption of ordered economic intercourse. But Britain had even more immediate concerns. In Ireland the end of the war released the final surge of nationalism, leading first to armed repression by the government and then, after the signature of the treaty establishing the Irish Free State in a partitioned island, to further fighting between those who had accepted the settlement and the bitter-enders. In India the new phase in opposition political activity was also accompanied by acts of violence, and although in the end relative calm was restored and some constitutional advance made, the effect of the turmoil was disheartening to all protagonists of an agreed and peaceful evolution. In Egypt likewise, a nationalist challenge had to be faced.
Keywords
Prime Minister British Government Peace Treaty British Opinion Soviet GovernmentPreview
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Notes
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