Education, Persons and Society pp 159-192 | Cite as
Education, Persons and Society
Abstract
The approach to the philosophy of education adopted in Chapter 1 took the idea of teaching rather than that of education as its central concern, and teaching in turn was thought of as a social practice carried on by teachers in accordance with a social tradition. A tradition provides those engaged in a social practice with a way of seeing and doing which lays down how that practice is to be carried out. It does so by providing an overall purpose which tells them what to do and by providing the knowledge and skills which make it possible for them to do it. Attention has been drawn to many sorts of social practice besides teaching, including painting and medicine, and to theoretical enquiries such as science and history, which vary from one another in seeing things from a separate point of view and having a different overall purpose. It is the overall purpose of a practice which provides its principle of unity, allowing otherwise unconnected actions, for example all of the very varied things which teachers do, to be seen as part of the same practice. This is possible because what a person is doing may be described either from a very limited perspective or from a broader point of view.
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Notes and References
- 1.Cf. Glenn Langford, Teaching as a Profession (Manchester University Press, 1978), Chapter 4, section IV.Google Scholar
- 2.Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I, I, 1, p. 1.Google Scholar
- 3.Agency was also discussed briefly in Chapter 3, section II, section II, 2(c) and Chapter 4, section I.Google Scholar
- 4.Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, XXVII, 9, p. 162.Google Scholar
- 5.Ibid., II, VIII, 12, p. 59.Google Scholar
- 6.Ibid., I, I, 8, p. 5.Google Scholar
- 7.Ibid., II, VIII, 2, p. 56.Google Scholar
- 8.Grice’s classic discussion of meaning is relevant here; see H. P. Grice, ‘Meaning’ in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic (Oxford University Press, 1967). Grice’s paper was originally published in Philosophical Review, 66 (1957).Google Scholar
- 9.Grice, ‘Meaning’, p. 44 makes a similar distinction between ‘deliberately and openly letting someone know’ and ‘getting someone to think’, on the one hand, and ‘telling’ on the other.Google Scholar
- 10.Cf. Glenn Langford, ‘Persons as Necessarily Social’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 8, No. 3 (1978).Google Scholar
- 11.Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (J. M. Dent, London, 1910), p.93.Google Scholar
- 12.Some of the objections considered here were made by Adrian Thatcher, ‘Education and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, XIV, No. 1 (1980)Google Scholar
- cf. also my response, Glenn Langford, ‘Reply to Adrian Thatcher’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, XIV, No. 1 (1980).Google Scholar
- 13.Adrian Thatcher, ‘Learning to Become Persons — A Theological Approach to Educational Aims’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 36 (1983).Google Scholar
- 14.Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, XXVII, 8, p. 160.Google Scholar
- 15.R. Descartes, Discourse on Method (J. M. Dent, London, 1912), Part IV, p. 27.Google Scholar
- 16.Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, I, 24, p. 44.Google Scholar
- 17.J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, in Philosophical Papers (Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 185.Google Scholar