Williamson1 argues that managers have discretion in pursuing policies which maximise their own utility rather than attempting the maximisation of profits which maximises the utility of owner-shareholders. Profit acts as a constraint to this managerial behaviour, in that the financial market and the shareholders require a minimum profit to be paid out in the form of dividends, otherwise the job security of managers is endangered.
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O. Williamson’s Model of Managerial Discretion
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