Abstract
Although Mill signally fails to prove the truth of the utility-principle, it may yet be true. But rather than investigate this question by seeking exceptions, I shall conclude by showing why his critics are dispensed from this trouble, and by simultaneously indicating a radical defect in Utilitarianism. Briefly, there is a far-reaching inconsistency between Mill’s notion of the nature of ethical philosophy and his primary objective in the essay. According to Mill, the aim of the former, to repeat it, is “to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them” (my italics). Mill, like Bentham, writes as a reformer and uses his standard of morality to criticize existing institutions and practices. The questions whether, or how far, his principle and its consequences square with “the morality of common sense” does not concern him. But in that case, the question of the truth of his principle cannot arise—though that of its goodness certainly does. Hence, Mill’s main aim in Utilitarianism, which is to prove the truth of the utility-principle, is misconceived, and any attempt by a critic to establish its truth or falsity would be misconceived also.