Argentina’s Nationalism: Myth or Reality?
Chapter
Abstract
There are two mythical, but widely held, explanations of why the Argentine economy has not performed satisfactorily since the 1920s. One blames the Great Depression, which closed many important markets for Argentina’s agricultural exports and encouraged the development of industry; the other puts the blame squarely on Perón.
Keywords
Political Economy Foreign Firm Foreign Capital Trade Surplus Railway Company
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Notes
- 1.The Economist, 14 November 1953, p. 541.Google Scholar
- 2.The Statist, International Banking Supplement, 13 December 1952, p. 34.Google Scholar
- 3.H. S. Ferns, ‘The Economics of Beef’, The Times Literary Supplement, 15 August 1975, p. 924.Google Scholar
- 5.United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1950 (New York, 1951) p. 15.Google Scholar
- 6.C. Díaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, (New Haven, Conn., 1970) pp. 443 and 446.Google Scholar
- 7.Ibid., p. 435.Google Scholar
- 9.For the position of Argentina between the suspension of sterling convertibility in August 1947 and sterling devaluation in 1959, compared with other sterling holders, see Brian Tew, ‘Sterling as an International Currency’, The Australian Economic Record, June 1948, p. 52.Google Scholar
- 11.For the dates in which the different countries negotiated the right to convert sterling into dollars, see Sir Richard Clarke, Anglo-American Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942–49, Ed. Sir Alec Cairncross (Oxford, 1982) p. 1985.Google Scholar
- 14.E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace (Princeton, N.J., 1953) p. 341.Google Scholar
- 15.H. Herring, A History of Latin America from the Beginning to the Present (London, 1955) pp. 649–50.Google Scholar
- 17.The Economist, 2 August 1952, p. 305.Google Scholar
- 20.‘Like Peter, Like Paul — Like Perón’, The Economist, 29 March 1952, p. 785.Google Scholar
- 21.W. Diebold in Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic Co-operation, 1947–51 (New York, 1952) devotes a chapter to the problem.Google Scholar
- 22.Concrete examples can be found in United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1948 (Geneva, 1949) pp. 108–10.Google Scholar
- 23.‘E.C.A. Pressure to End Double Pricing’, The Statist, 28 January 1950, pp. 99–100.Google Scholar
- 26.Earl Cowley in Parliamentary Debates, Lords, vol. 327, 26 January 1972, col. 334.Google Scholar
- 34.Luigi Offedu, La sfida del’acciaio: Vita di Agostino Rocca (Venezia, 1984) p. 230. This book contains many fascinating hints of both the difficulties and the opportunities that Argentina presented at the time to a particularly able and energetic man who could offer the most up-to-date technology. For the crucial connections with di Tella see pp. 177, 178, 199, 200, 206, 207, 209, 219, 220, 225 and 229.Google Scholar
- 35.Ibid., p. 18.Google Scholar
- 36.George Messersmith, ‘British-Argentine Agreement for the Purchase of Meat’, in G. Messersmith, ‘Memoir Notes’, deposited at the University of Delaware Library, p. 19. Probably written in 1955.Google Scholar
- 37.Top secret letter from George Messersmith to James F. Byrnes (US Secretary of State), 30 October 1946, ibid., p. 7.Google Scholar
- 38.Ibid., p. 6.Google Scholar
- 39.Boletin DFM, April 1947, as quoted in J. J. Real: 30 Años de historia argentina (Buenos Aires, 1962) p. 113.Google Scholar
- 46.ECLA, El proceso de industrialización en la Argentina en el periodo 1976/1983 (Buenos Aires, 1984) p. 14.Google Scholar
Copyright information
© Guido di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch 1989