The Radicalisation of Functional Socialism 1968–80

  • Malcolm B. Hamilton
Chapter
Part of the University of Reading European and International Studies book series (UREIS)

Abstract

By the late sixties the relative calm in relations between workers and employers in Sweden was breaking down. Relative deprivation was increasing, less as a consequence of stagnation in incomes and rising unemployment, but more as a consequence of the very policies that the unions had themselves pursued which had entailed very high rates of mobility and consequent disruption to patterns of life. By the mid-seventies this sense of disillusionment and relative deprivation was intensified when the Swedish economy began to go into recession. Commitment to full employment delayed the impact of the world recession for some time but ultimately real incomes began to fall and the more so as a result of the commitment to full employment.

Keywords

Pension Fund Relative Deprivation Active Labour Market Policy Centre Party Industrial Democracy 
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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© Malcolm B. Hamilton 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Malcolm B. Hamilton
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ReadingUK

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