On Reconciling Arrow’s Theory of Social Choice with Harsanyi’s Fundamental Utilitarianism

  • Peter J. Hammond
Chapter

Abstract

The last paragraph of Kenneth Arrow’s Nobel Lecture is characteristic of the man:

The philosophical and distributive implications of the paradox of social choice are still not clear. Certainly there is no simple way out. I hope that others will take this paradox as a challenge rather than as a discouraging barrier (Arrow 1973a; 1974).

Keywords

Social Norm Social Choice Social Welfare Function Walrasian Equilibrium Pareto Principle 
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© George R. Feiwel 1987

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  • Peter J. Hammond

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