The Korean Decisions

  • Callum A. MacDonald
Chapter

Abstract

The Asian decisions of 1947/8 represented an attempt to balance commitments with resources. In a period of budgetary restraint, first priority was given to containing communism in Europe. In 1949, however, US policy began to assume new directions which dictated the response to the attack on South Korea in June 1950. Two sets of factors lay behind the changes. The first was international. In September 1949 the Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb, shattering the US atomic monopoly which had existed since 1945. In October Mao proclaimed a People’s Republic in Beijing, leading the largest nation in the world into the communist camp. In this situation, it was feared that Washington was losing the initiative in the cold war. A further expansion of communist power would endanger American credibility. Western Europe and Japan would lose faith in US guarantees, seeking refuge in neutrality or an accommodation with the Russians. Washington would have lost the cold war. The second was domestic. The new international climate had political repercussions at home, denting public confidence in containment. The Republicans, denied power in the Presidential elections of 1948, attempted to capitalize on this mood, charging Truman and the Democrats with softness on communism and the loss of China.

Keywords

Security Council Atomic Bomb Asian Mainland Eastern Wing Communist Power 
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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© Callum A. MacDonald 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Callum A. MacDonald
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WarwickUK

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